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1. Introduction 
We are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain 
fictions of our own devising…  
Isaac Newton (1687) 
My goal in writing this essay is to provide a broad history of ideas related to human 
nutritional ecology. The central concept of nutritional ecology is that proper human fetal 
development, as well as maternal body maintenance before, during, and following 
pregnancy require a diverse suite of both energy-providing macronutrients (carbohydrates, 
fats, and proteins) and non-caloric micronutrients (vitamins, minerals, and water) (Hockett 
and Haws 2003, 2005). As a result, past human foragers who consistently consumed a 
relatively diverse diet should have set the nutritional framework that may have sparked 
increases in their population size and density. In contrast, restricted diets are unlikely to be 
associated with demographic pulses in ancient foraging societies. 
By definition macronutrients (energy-producing carbohydrates, fats, and proteins) must be 
consumed in relatively large quantities compared to micronutrients (non-caloric vitamins 
and minerals), but this does not mean that the energy producing nutrients are more 
important to human health than the non-caloric nutrients, including water. A lack of 
vitamin-A in a human diet would leave a person as dead as one who starved to death 
through chronic energy deficiency. Importantly, there is not a single food group that 
provides all of the essential macro- and micronutrients necessary for proper fetal 
development, maternal health during and following pregnancy, and later growth and 
development of the individual (Ashworth and Antipatis, 2001; Fall et al., 2003; 
Ramakrishnan 1999). Humans can survive on restricted diets but these typically cause the 
over-consumption of certain critical nutrients and the under-consumption of others, which 
in turn has been shown to negatively impact mortality rates. They also create a host of 
potential body and mind health problems, particularly if protein is the major energy source 
consumed rather than carbohydrates (see also Hockett 2011). These facts, however, do not 
necessarily mean that ancient human foragers were engaged in the active pursuit of a 
balanced diet (maximizing essential nutrient diversity). Selection, however, may have 
exerted a greater role upon human societies at particular moments in space and time 
because of differences in dietary intake. 
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The basis for a broad theoretical framework of human nutritional ecology may be presented 
as a series of questions: (1) what are the nutritional requirements for proper human fetal 
growth and development?; (2) what are the nutritional requirements for pregnant females 
before, during, and following pregnancy in order to ensure long-term maternal health?; (3) 
how can these nutritional requirements be obtained in the foods available to various human 
societies in space and time?; (4) what are the demographic consequences of under-
consuming specific nutrients and over-consuming others?; and (5) could differences in the 
consumption of the variety of macro- and micronutrients have lead to, or at least 
contributed to, population expansions, declines, and replacements in the past? 
Nutritional influences on human evolution must focus on both macronutrients and 
micronutrients to be meaningful, and nutritional ecology as a broad theoretical model 
should be developed with this holistic interpretive framework in mind (Hockett and 
Haws 2005:25, Table 1; Figure 1). Models that focus only on macronutrients, or that give 
paramount importance to energy as an explanatory framework (e.g., Broughton et al., 
2011) reduce data to the point that meaningful interpretations of the past are an unlikely 
outcome. 
The nutrition facts as we know them today, namely that diverse essential nutrient intake 
lowers infant and maternal mortality rates, are no revelation to anthropology and 
archaeology. There is a relatively large, anthropologically-oriented literature that has been 
published on human nutrition over the past 75 years (e.g., Arnott, 1976; Eaton et al., 1988; 
Harding and Teleki, 1981; Harris and Ross, 1987; Jenike, 2001; Kehoe and Giletti, 1981; 
Newman, 1962; Quin, 1959; Richards, 1932; Schwarcz and Shoeninger, 1991; Stini, 1971; 
Underwood, 1975; Vayda, 1970; Wing and Brown, 1979). In addition, the American 
Anthropological Association incorporated a human nutrition interest group in 1974 called 
the Council on Nutritional Anthropology, and since 2004 is known as the Society for the 
Anthropology of Food and Nutrition (American Anthropological Association, 2006). 
Historically, reductionism as an interpretive framework was discussed by David Hume 
(1748/1955) in the mid-18th century, concretely formulated in economics in the early-to-
middle 19th century by John Stuart Mill (Persky, 1995), formed the core of Max Weber’s 
methodology in sociology in the mid-20th century (Zouboulakis, 2001), and it has become 
synonymous with Homo economicus, or Primitive Economic Man, in microeconomics ever 
since (e.g., Pearson, 2000). 
A reductionistic framework in anthropology and archaeology that hypothesized that the 
capture of energy was the key to understanding human development may have been first 
formulated in a comprehensive way by Leslie White in the early 20th century (Adams, 1978). 
Beginning in the late 1930s, White began to outline his ideas regarding the relationships 
between cultural systems and technology in reference to the efficiency of energy capture – 
ideas that he borrowed extensively from researchers such as Hermann Helmholz, Wilhelm 
Ostwald, and Alfred Lotka. As Binford (1972) reiterated, White’s central theses were 
twofold: (1) that energy flow in nonliving systems fundamentally differed from that seen in 
the living world; in the case of the former, the second Law of Thermodynamics held that 
matter and energy flowed from a state of greater organization to less organized states; in the 
case of the latter, matter and energy flowed in the opposite direction from states of less to 
greater organization; and (2) as a result, those organisms that could capture and utilize free 
energy more efficiently than others must necessarily hold a selective advantage over others. 
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The development of technology in cultural systems was all about the efficient capture of free 
energy: 
The struggle for existence and survival has two aspects: (1) the adjustment of the 
organism to its habitat in terms of temperature, humidity, radiation, subsistence, etc.; 
and (2) the struggle with other living beings for subsistence and favorable habitats. In 
this struggle, in both its aspects, “the advantage must go to those organisms whose 
energy-capturing devices are most efficient.” Any gains won are kept. The tendency of 
the life process is always to achieve a maximum of matter-and-energy transformation. 
This is true regardless of whether the energy is expended quantitatively in mere 
reproduction of numbers of organisms or in the development of higher forms of living 
systems (White, 1959:37-38). 
In the passage above, White was quoting Alfred Lotka (1945), who was in fact paraphrasing 
his own words written 24 years prior: 
Furthermore, in the competition which takes place among organisms, the advantage 
must go to those whose energy-capturing devices are most effective in directing 
available energy into such channels as are favorable to the preservation of the species 
(Lotka, 1921:195). 
Are these reductionistic conclusions that hypothesize that energy optimization is the key 
to understanding the evolutionary trajectories of living organisms accurate? Is it the case, 
then, that human foragers would choose which foods to eat and which to ignore based on 
caloric return rates available to them in space and time because this subsistence strategy 
always offers reproductive advantages under any social and environmental 
circumstances? Has selection been so pervasive in molding human behavior that all 
economic activities can be reduced to the role they play in energy capture and 
reproductive fitness? Can archaeologists ignore micronutrients, or non-energy producing 
substances because they are meaningless to understanding human evolution? Between 
1960 and the end of the 20th century, many biologists were arguing that nonhuman 
animals were energy maximizers as well, (e.g., Kamil et al., 1987; Keene, 1983), so there 
seemed to be an emerging recognition of a foraging pattern that cross-cut the entire 
Animal Kingdom, explaining the foraging habits of animals as diverse as locusts, goldfish, 
flying squirrels, and humans (Foley, 1985). 
Does empirical research confirm the validity of this all-encompassing foraging framework? 
A review of the biological and anthropological literature suggests that it does not 
(Campbell, 1987; Emlen and Emlen, 1975; Gray, 1987; Heider, 1976; Ingold, 2000; Keene, 
1983; Pierce and Ollason, 1987; Schluter, 1981; Weiss, 2000). Yet the 21st century began where 
the 20th century left off, with anthropologists and archaeologists continuing to argue that 
human behaviors are best explained through reductionistic models of efficiency of energy 
capture (e.g., Broughton et al., 2011; Winterhalder and Smith, 2000). Further, human 
behaviors that were shown to exist outside of an energy optimization model were argued to 
represent ‘ancillary variables’ to understanding why, for example, humans forage for food 
in specific ways (Winterhalder and Smith, 2000). It is more than coincidental that rather than 
using the phrase ‘ancillary variables’, John Stuart Mill (1836) called human behaviors that 
did not lead to an optimization of economic wealth in Capitalistic societies ‘disturbing 
causes’ 170 years ago. 
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To the contrary, it has been well established that humans choose which foods to eat and 
which to ignore based on a multitude of factors, each of which may have dramatic effects 
upon mortality and fertility rates. These factors include, but are not limited to, the 
physiological necessity of consuming macro- and micronutrients to sustain life, taste 
preferences, availability of specific foods due to factors such as climate, ecological conditions 
in space/time and competition with other groups, social and cognitive 
events/festivals/feasts, food taboos related to religious beliefs, established trade networks, 
and technological innovations (e.g., Counihan, 1999; Harris and Ross, 1987; Thrupp, 1867). 
None of these variables are necessarily ancillary to explaining human behaviors; to argue 
that they must be because they do not lead to energy maximization reduces scientific 
methodology to a tautological argument. 
2. The development of nutritional ecology in anthropology 
Thirty years ago anthropology and archaeology were poised to develop a theoretical 
framework of human nutritional ecology. A wealth of nutritional studies in human foraging 
societies had already accumulated throughout the 20th century; by the mid-1970s general 
anthropology texts concerning human nutritional ecology began to appear (e.g., Little and 
Morren, 1976). Nutritional anthropologists were noting aspects of unique human cognition 
and subsequent dietary choices that dramatically effected mortality trends. 
The difficulties of identifying causative factors and the complex interactions of 
influential variables underlying even severe forms of neurological pathology may be 
illustrated in a review of the epidemiology of kuru, a degenerative disorder of the 
central nervous system found only among the Fore people of New Guinea and their 
immediate neighbors. The clinical features of this disease, which killed over 2,000 
people between 1957 and 1973, have been fully described … Death usually occurs 
within six to twelve months after the initial appearance of recognizable symptoms of 
the disease. Until quite recently, the disease principally affected adult females, but 
children of both sexes seemed equally susceptible. A genetic model was proposed 
which suggested that kuru was expressed in the phenotype of homozygous or 
heterozygous children of both sexes and in the homozygous or heterozygous adult 
female, but occurred only rarely in the heterozygous adult male. Within the last decade, 
however, the incidence of kuru has declined drastically among the Fore, more 
noticeably among women and children than adults. The implications of these changes 
led to more intensive investigations which eventually resulted in the identification of a 
slow-acting virus as the causative agent of the disease and the detection of ritual 
cannibalism as the means of natural transmission of the virus. Since women and 
children are the most active participants in such feasts, the gradual disappearance of 
ritual cannibalism among the Fore since 1957 has reduced their exposure to 
contamination from the highly infectious brain tissue of deceased kuru victims and 
altered the patterns of incidence of the disease (Underwood, 1975:28-29). 
Here was an empirical link between the complex relationships amongst diet, human 
cognitive choice about what to eat and who within a given society is expected to eat it, and 
mortality trends. Despite studies such as these, holistically-based nutritional ecology studies 
were never embraced by archaeologists. Instead, archaeologists turned to biological studies 
of nonhuman animal behavior (e,g, Emlen, 1966; McArthur and Pianka, 1966; Schoener, 
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1987) for models to interpret ancient human foraging decisions within an exclusively 
Darwinian framework. These models consisted of variations on reductionistic, energy 
optimization models (e.g., prey choice and patch choice models) – which I will refer 
throughout the remainder of this essay as the development of a Primitive Economic Man 
framework, or simply PEM. 
PEM is a deductively-based interpretive framework that creates a narrow vision of human 
action centered around the maximization of a ‘currency’. The currency tracked through time 
ranges from capital wealth to calories to babies. In archaeology, one or more currencies are 
often linked, such that, for example, a maximization of caloric intake relative to work effort 
serves to foster the successful procreation of more babies in those individuals who act 
accordingly. 
PEM has much in common with the Homo economicus character much written about in 
economics for more than a century. Doucouliagos (1994:877) summarized Homo economicus 
thusly: ‘The neoclassical economists’ Homo Economicus has several characteristics, the most 
important of which are (1) maximizing (optimizing) behavior; (2) the cognitive ability to 
exercise rational choice; and (3) individualistic behavior and independent tastes and 
preferences.’ 
Some of PEM’s characteristics, such as individual self-interest, can be traced back to 
Antiquity, while others have much in common with John Stuart Mill’s (1836) theoretical 
construct of the model Capitalist. ‘Economic man’, later referred to as Homo oeconomicus, was 
a term applied to Mill’s method of economic analysis, but his Linnaean classification was 
originally created in a context that was not intended as a compliment (Persky, 1995:222). 
According to Persky (1995), John Kells Ingram’s A History of Political Economy (1888) may 
have been the first to use the term ‘economic man’ in reference to Mill’s work. Persky (1995) 
also argues that Mill’s ‘economic man’ was inherently Lamarkian in character, namely that 
one generation of rational decision-makers would pass this behavioral tendency on to the 
next generation, who would then embrace the Capitalistic principles taught to them, and 
then pass these on to the next generation, and so on. Max Weber (1915/1946) later referred 
to Mill’s ‘economic man’ as Homo oeconomicus, and the term has been commonly used 
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in economics. 
Archaeology’s reliance on PEM as a model to interpret ancient human foraging strategies is 
most paradoxical when one considers that the nutrition sciences, which is the discipline that 
has pursued links between dietary intake and maternal and infant mortality rates, has not 
seriously applied a similar model in their discipline since the 1920s. The nutrition sciences 
first began breaking away from PEM in the 19th century (Carpenter, 2003a; Carpenter et al., 
1997). Carpenter et al. (1997:1018S) note that the discovery that organic and inorganic 
micronutrients were as essential to human development, growth, and maintenance as were 
the energy providing macronutrients finally broke the dogmatic thinking that protein, in 
particular, was of paramount importance to human health, and that reductionistic models 
that focused only on macronutrients could serve as a primary explanatory framework in the 
nutrition sciences. 
While researching the historical context of ideas related to human nutritional ecology, I 
discovered that the early history of nutrition and the early history of PEM mirrored one 
another. Both stem from a number of hypothetical and philosophical beliefs about the 
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universe in general, and more specifically about the place of humankind and human 
societies within that universe – as well as the factors that cause human societies to change, 
grow, and die. Many of these beliefs date back to the early 18th century, and some of them 
date back to the European Middle Ages and, earlier still, to ancient Greece and Rome. And 
some of these lingering beliefs are still maintained within modern models of PEM 
(Stoczkowski, 2002). Importantly, however, other disciplines such as nutrition science that 
once promoted ideas commensurate with PEM have abandoned these beliefs because of 
intensive empirical research that falsified them. The time has come for more researchers in 
archaeology to challenge reductionistic energy imperative frameworks, and pay more 
attention to the nutrition sciences by incorporating the implications of nutrition-based 
studies into model-building. An historical development of the ideas that led to the creation 
of both PEM and human nutritional ecology is a necessary step in that process. 
3. A brief historical narrative of nutritional ecology and Primitive Economic 
Man 
The following narrative tracks the development of ideas that characterize human nutritional 
ecology and the PEM frameworks, and the philosophers and scientists who played critical 
roles in their respective developments. For those already familiar to some degree with the 
literature, it will be understood that a detailed account that focused only on the 
philosophical belief that human nature is rooted in self-interested behaviors could fill a 
small library. This brief summary cannot account for all researchers who contributed in one 
way or another to the development of PEM and nutritional ecology. I have attempted, 
therefore, to choose specific authors and their works as representative of broad time periods 
of human thought as they relate to the development of PEM and nutritional ecology. 
Consider this as a place to begin an epistemological journey. 
3.1 Antiquity: The early beginnings of ideal types, optimal states of nature, self-
interest, and cultural ecology 
Lovejoy and Boas (1935) and Boas (1948) summarized many of the ideas related to 
“primitivism” in Antiquity. Important philosophers of this early period included Lucretius 
(99-55 BC). A Roman poet and author, Lucretius wrote of individualism and the fact that 
earlier humans must have lived principally with their own welfare in mind. Self-interest 
was a consequence of primitive peoples living alone, each fending for his or her own needs 
and safety (Lovejoy and Boas, 1935:227-228). Origen (AD 185 – 254) linked rationalism with 
‘primitive’ peoples by way of necessity. Humans are rational because God endowed us to 
invent better ways of behaving, which we are always striving to do, including better ways to 
procure food (Boas, 1948:194). On the diet of earlier peoples, the Roman priest Novatian 
(AD 200 – 258) noted a common conception of the time: the superiority of meat-eating (Boas, 
1948:26); in contrast, Saint Basil (AD 329 – 379) noted that a vegetarian fare may suffice 
(Boas, 1948:114). And Saint Jerome (ca. AD 331 – 420) offered an early glimpse of cultural 
ecology when he wrote: “But who does not know that each people is accustomed to eat, not 
according to a universal law of nature, but according to what things are found abundantly 
in their habitat” (quoted in Boas, 1948:130-131). 
Two of the most significant ideas that developed out of Antiquity included the notions of an 
optimal state of nature and ideal types. Saint Augustine (AD 354 – 430), like so many 
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writers before and after him, described the first ideal-type, or optimal state of nature: 
Paradise, or the Garden of Eden: 
Man lived in Paradise as he wished, so long as he wished what God had commanded. 
He lived in the enjoyment of God, from Whose goodness he was good. He lived in need 
of nothing, having it in his power always so to live. He had food lest he be hungry, 
drink lest he be thirsty, the tree of life lest old age wear him away. No corruption was in 
his body nor did he feel arising from his body any threats to the acuity of any of his 
senses. No inner disease was to be feared, no blow from without. The soundest health 
was in his flesh, in his spirit complete tranquility (quoted in Boas, 1948:48-49). 
The Garden of Eden represented an ideal, perfect state of nature that supplied maximum 
subsistence and mental efficiency. After the Fall, it was each individual’s choice to try and 
reach this optimal state as best he or she could. In this framework, rationality was defined 
by an optimization of behaviors (lack of greed and lust, etc.) that would then be rewarded 
with eternal life. The general structure of optimization amongst both the story of the Garden 
of Eden and the Fall of Man, on the one hand, and the natural philosophy of PEM, on the 
other, is remarkably similar. As unpleasant as many scientists might find this comparison, 
the similarities amongst the overall structure of the respective models are too 
complimentary to ignore. 
In any case, speculations about early human behavior, as well as the creation of optimal 
states of nature and ideal types by philosophers of the Antiquity period hinted at the PEM 
framework that was to formally develop in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
3.2 Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: The beast-machine, least action, the 
conservation of energy, and hints of a modern nutrition science 
The story of PEM changes little through the Middle Ages. The great philosophers and 
mathematicians of the 17th and early 18th centuries, however, would set the stage for 
different and often conflicting conceptions of PEM. 
PEM models through the 17th and 18th centuries often interpreted human behavior as 
analogous to energy-maximizing machines. This mechanistic vision of the living universe 
formed an important part of the philosophy of Renee Decartes (1596 - 1650) (Brown, 1936), 
although the idea of pondering the question ‘are animals soul-bearing beings or simply 
machines?’ did not originate with him, and can be traced to Antiquity (Cohen, 1936:56). 
During the first one-half of the 17th century, however, Decartes offered a rather 
comprehensive vision on the nature of nonhuman animal behavior and motion by 
contrasting it with the human condition. This vision, referred to as animal automatism, 
argued that animals did not have souls or think, and therefore their behaviors could be 
reduced to analogies with the movements of machines – the so-called ‘beast-machine’ (e.g., 
Cohen, 1936). 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) offered two important suggestions about early human 
behavior in the middle of the 17th century: (1) humans were inherently self-serving beings, 
and (2) this self-interested nepotism naturally lead to a state of competition amongst 
individuals. These concepts would later become important centerpieces of Darwinian 
selection, as well as the nature of PEM. Hobbes called this perpetual competition amongst 
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individuals a ‘state of war’. Hobbes’ (1651:84) famous essay leads directly to one of the most 
often quoted passages about early humans, which comes at the end of the following 
paragraph: 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to 
every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, 
than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal… and 
which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 
Hobbes established this state of early humanity to advocate a centralized authority to 
govern society, because it is only through the rule of law as established by governments or 
ruling classes that this perpetual ‘state of war’ could be avoided, which would then lead to 
greater advancements in the arts and sciences. 
An important 17th century figure for the later development of the principles of least action, 
as well as those related to maxima and minima in nature that would develop in the 18th 
century was Pierre de Fermat (1601 – 1665). In the mid-1600s, de Fermat studied the paths of 
light rays. In 1657, he published what he proposed as the Principle of Least Time to describe 
the pathways of light, and defined the principle as ‘Nature always acts by the shortest 
course’ (Jourdain, 1913:48). 
Isaac Newton (1642 - 1727) later published his Principia, or The Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy in 1687. In the latter 17th century, as well as the 18th and 19th centuries, 
Newtonian physics would be used by others to argue that the living universe could be 
explained via analogy to the mechanical properties of the nonliving universe. As Carpenter 
(1994:5) noted, some prominent medical researchers of the latter 17th century began their 
textbooks with overviews of Newton’s Principia as a guide to understanding the human 
body. These analogies, including de Fermat’s principle of the conservation of time in the 
movement of light through space, would form integral components to PEM frameworks 
into the early 20th century. 
There also were late 17th century experiments related to optimal states and ideal types. For 
example, Sloane (1699) discusses experiments designed to perfect plants through selective 
breeding. He relates these studies to the fact that the Creator made living things changeable 
in order for humanity, through selective breeding, to create ideal or perfect types for our 
benefit. And early in the 18th century, discussions that harkened to the times of Antiquity 
once again ensued regarding whether humans were or were not, by nature, flesh-eaters. For 
example, Wallis (1701:775) wrote that it was Man’s natural state to be carnivorous. 
David Hume (1711 – 1776) argued that there are uniformities of human nature, and one 
component of scientific and philosophical inquiries is to isolate them. Hume suggested 
reducing actions to smaller, more manageable components or ‘regularities’. Hume also 
asked that even if there are regularities in human nature – which may turn out to be a 
principle cause of human action - does that mean that we can, by inference, predict the 
effect, or the outcome of those actions? Perhaps we can in mathematics, but in moral 
philosophy Hume answers in the negative, although this does not in and of itself render the 
elucidation of regularities of human behavior insignificant (Hume, 1748:95). Hume’s idea 
that diversity of human action may be reduced to a smaller number of ‘regularities’ would 
be brought forward into Adam Smith’s analysis of Capitalist markets, the latter published in 
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the same year of Hume’s death. It would also form the core of John Stuart Mill’s ‘economic 
man’ concept in the early 19th century. 
In the 18th century the Hobbesian ideals of self-interested behaviors once again took center 
stage as one of the principal regularities guiding human nature through the philosophical 
writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778). As noted by Ogden (1940), John Locke’s 
(1632 - 1704) Two Treatises of Government, published in 1690, argued that men have the right 
to do whatever they wished as long as their behaviors did not impede others from doing the 
same. While Locke argued that this was part of ‘human nature’, he did not advance the idea 
that such behaviors would only be represented in so-called primitive groups – it was part of 
all human nature. Rousseau (1755), on the other hand, argued in his Second Discourse that 
humans were not only self-interested beings, but that this behavior was representative of an 
earlier, primitive state of human nature (Ogden, 1940). Rousseau (1762:50) argued in his 
Social Contract seven years later, however, that self-interested preservation extended from 
this earlier condition into civilized society as well. Rousseau’s argument was soundly 
attacked in England, ironically by those advocating an optimal state framework (Ogden, 
1940). For his detractors, humankind’s primary state of being was intellectual; what 
separated the civilized from the primitive was a continuous desire to reach an optimal state 
of perfection of being, which would lead to the greatest happiness. 
Of greater significance, however, for the creation of a more modern PEM interpretive 
framework was the discovery of the Principle of Least Action in physics, generally 
attributed to Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698 – 1759), and related ideas regarding 
the conservation of energy. The Principle of Least Action in the nonliving would later be 
transformed into a Principle of Least Effort in the living, with the latter serving as the living 
equivalent to the conservation of energy in the nonliving world. For his part, Maupertuis 
saw the Principle of Least Action as part of the Intelligent Design of the Divine Universe. 
Others, of course, interpreted the conservation of the life force differently. Maupertuis 
figured prominently in the debate between materialist and divine causation in the mid-
1700s. And although Maupertuis chose divine causation, he would provide to the 
materialists of the 20th century a non-divine final cause of the universe – the Principle of 
Least Action. 
Following Maupertuis’ writings on Least Action was Leonhard Euler (1707 -1783). In 1753 
Euler deduced a mathematical principle of least effort based on a body that begins at rest and 
moves to a fixed point, the sum of all the efforts operating equal to a maximum and a 
minimum (Jourdain, 1913:29). Others also advanced mathematical formulae for describing 
the principle of maxima and minima in nature during the latter one-half of the 18th century. 
Included among them was Joseph Lagrange (1736 – 1813), who, in 1759, stated that it was 
‘his intention of deriving the whole of mechanics, by means of the principle of the least 
quantity of action, from a method he had of investigating the maxima and minima of 
indefinite integral formulae’ (Jourdain, 1913:51). These principles related to least-action, 
least-effort, and maxima and minima in nature were later combined with hypotheses about 
ideal types and optimal states in nature to form the core of PEM interpretive frameworks. 
For example, the original principle developed in physics of maxima (PEM = greatest 
energetic efficiency and/or reproductive success) and that of minima (PEM = with the least 
expenditure of energy or effort) form critical components to models derived from 
optimization interpretive frameworks of the 20th and 21st centuries. 
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Early 18th century physics also helped set the stage for what was to develop in economics in 
the second one-half of that century. Within the throes of the development and controversy 
surrounding the Principle of Least Action and the conservation of the active force (energy) 
came the economist Adam Smith (1723 – 1790). His best-known work, Wealth of Nations, 
published in 1776, was one of only two major works he published in his lifetime (Nieli, 
1986). Wealth of Nations became, and continues to serve as a sounding board for Capitalist 
principles. Within this work is also found many of the salient features of the modern PEM 
interpretive framework. These features include: (1) the belief that humans are, by nature, 
self-serving beings; (2) those that act only in their own self-interest will have a competitive 
advantage over those who help others; and (3) self-serving individuals naturally attempt to 
optimize, or to accumulate material wealth in the most efficient manner possible. These 
actions define rational behavior. For Smith, those who are the most efficient at the 
accumulation of wealth will have a competitive advantage. Importantly, if all self-serving 
individuals attempted to optimize their accumulation of wealth, a net benefit would be 
realized amongst both the individual and the society: 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous 
employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, 
and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage 
naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most 
advantageous to the society (Smith, 1776:333). 
This would lead to Smith’s famous line concerning the unwitting natural state of affairs that 
lead humans to be judged by an ‘invisible hand’, a process that leads to greater efficiency for 
both the individual and society (Smith, 1776:335): 
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how 
much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign 
industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that was no part 
of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good 
done by those who affected to trade for the public good. 
Smith essentially defined the salient features of Homo economicus, who would be further 
refined into a reductionistic method of economic study 60 years later through the writings of 
John Stuart Mill and others. There has been much recent revisionist literature in economics 
concerning the role of empathy and individualism in Smith’s writings (e.g., Alvey, 2004; 
Hill, 2004; Lamb, 1974; Nieli, 1986; Peart and Levy, 2004; Prieto, 2004; Waterman, 2002), 
none of which negates the central role that individualism was perceived to play in his vision 
of the ideal Capitalistic market operating within an optimally functioning society. 
Even before Maupertuis and Adam Smith, chemistry was slowly molding itself into a 
respectable discipline during the 18th century. Researchers such as Robert Boyle (1627 - 
1691) and Peter Shaw (~1693 - 1763) were quietly setting the framework for the Chemical 
Revolution that would occur late in the century, which itself marks the beginning of a 
scientific study of human nutrition (Carpenter, 2003a). For example, in 1723 Shaw was 
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‘maintaining that no disease should be regarded as incurable and that there was room for 
the application of the Newtonian method in medicine, as well as in those sciences based on 
mathematics’ (Gibbs, 1951:213). In 1725, Shaw also published an abridged version of Boyle’s 
works, including footnotes that updated Boyle’s original conclusions with current 
information, and this book was widely used between 1725 and 1817 (Gibbs, 1951). The latter 
part of the 18th century then witnessed the maturity of chemistry and nutrition. One of the 
principle players in these studies in France was Antoine Lavoisier (1743 – 1794) (Carpenter 
et al., 1997). But a scientific study of human nutrition was also to incur major setbacks in the 
very place in which it was maturing (Carpenter, 2003a:638). As Carpenter (2003a) details, 
the Chemical Revolution in France at the end of the 18th century witnessed the 
identification of the major elements of the universe, which encouraged the development of 
new methods in chemistry and nutrition. Being at the forefront of these studies and 
associating himself with the ‘wrong’ crowd during the Reign of Terror, however, Lavoisier 
was guillotined in 1794 (Grey, 1982; Hartog, 1941). 
3.3 Nineteenth century: Reductionism and an energy imperative paradigm sweep the 
natural sciences 
Chemistry and related nutrition studies both matured rapidly during the 19th century. In 
the early part of the century, François Magendie (1783 – 1855) reported on several 
important studies involving the nutritional requirements of mammals. Carpenter 
(2003a:639) recently recounted Magendie’s experiment in which he fed a dog a purified diet 
of sugar. The animal appeared to do well for about two weeks, but one month after the 
experiment began the dog died. Magendie concluded that ‘diversity and multiplicity of 
aliments is an important rule of hygiene; which is, moreover, indicated to us by our 
instincts’ (quoted in Carpenter, 2003a:639). 
Definitions of the term ‘nutrition’ in the early 19th century were general in nature, such as 
that offered by the Boston physician George Hayward in 1834: ‘The process by which the 
body increases in size, and the waste of its organs is repaired, is called nutrition’ (quoted in 
The North American Review, 1834:404). Nevertheless, the first one-half of the 19th century was 
dominated by thoughts of energy, and in particular protein, rather than nutrient diversity 
per se. And for these researchers, it was clear that the processes of body growth and organ 
repair could be explained by a balanced intake of protein. Justus Von Liebig (1803 - 1873) 
published his influential Animal Chemistry or Organic Chemistry in its Application to Physiology 
and Pathology in Germany in 1842. Liebig’s argument was that muscle contractions were 
caused by the explosive breakdown of protein molecules, and hence protein was the only 
true nutrient humans required for fuel and maintenance of healthy bodies (Carpenter, 
2003a:641). As Carpenter (2003a:641) noted, some of the preeminent European professors of 
medicine were concluding that outbreaks of ailments such as scurvy must have been caused 
by inadequate intakes of protein, despite overwhelming evidence that unknown nutrients 
found in fruits and some animal organs were known cures for these conditions. The energy 
imperative paradigm of the time led many researchers to ignore evidence that did not 
conform to the protein model – including Liebig himself. 
Liebig (1842:75) clearly had an energy-imperative paradigm and the principle of maxima 
and minima in mind when formulating his nutrition model, which included thoughts of the 
efficient use of energy in all walks of life, including early human behavior: 
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Cultivation is the economy of force. Science teaches us the simplest means of obtaining 
the greatest effect with the smallest expenditure of power, and with given means to 
produce a maximum force. The unprofitable exertion of power, the waste of force in 
agriculture, in other branches of industry, in science, or in social economy, is 
characteristic of the savage state, or the want of cultivation. 
This energy-imperative model of human nutrition dominated the thoughts and teachings of 
many prominent researchers and medical professionals throughout the19th century. In this 
model, health and disease patterns were caused by inadequate energy intake or imbalance. 
As Carpenter (1994) notes, Liebig’s monumental study deeply affected nutritional studies on 
both sides of the Atlantic until the end of the 19th century. 
Not all, however, embraced Liebig’s research. In fact, The North American Review for October, 
1842, soundly and sarcastically attacked Liebig’s conclusions. 
The previous reputation of the author, as a zealous and able analytical chemist, 
appears to have excited very high expectations of the value of the work that he was to 
produce, and to have prepared the way for the enthusiastic reception it met with. 
Professor Gregory declared, in the British Association , as we are informed in the 
Preface to the American Edition, “that the Association had just reason to be proud of 
such a work, as originating in their recommendation;” and Professors Lindley, 
Daubeny, and others, concur in regarding the date of its publication “as the 
commencement of a new era in the art of agriculture.” One of the Copely medals, of 
the Royal Society of London, was presented to the author the same year. The 
President, the Marquis of Northampton, in presenting the medal to Professor Liebig’s 
representative on the occasion, said, “My principle difficulty, in the present exercise 
of this the most agreeable part of my official duty, is to know, whether to consider M. 
Liebig’s inquiries as most important in a chemical or a physiological light.” If his 
Lordship will honor our Review with a careful perusal, we think he may be relieved 
of a part of his difficulty. 
This second Report is announced with the same flourish of trumpets. The American 
editor declares the author to be, without question, the first living authority in Organic 
Chemistry; and the translator, Dr. Gregory, has “experienced the highest admiration of 
the profound sagacity, which enabled the author to erect so beautiful a structure on the 
foundation of facts, which others had allowed to remain for so long a time utterly 
useless”, and regards its appearance as “the commencement of a new era in 
physiology.” We have thus, already, two new eras, a new era in agriculture, and a new 
era in physiology; and some two years hence, when the third Report shall be 
forthcoming, we shall doubtless have a new era in the art of dieting and cookery. 
Professor Liebig himself participates in the complacency with which his works are 
regarded by his admirers. His opinions are often given with a confidence which 
savours, not a little, of dogmatism; and he is not, always careful to mention the 
attainments and labors of others with all the respect, that may reasonably be 
demanded from a candid searcher after true knowledge. For example, he repeatedly 
speaks of “pretended experiments” and “experiments that teach nothing”, for no 
other reason, that is exhibited, than that they were not favorable to his conclusions; 
and this, too, while his own observations are referred to only by their results, without 
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any details to enable the reader to judge of their accuracy or sufficiency. He demands 
a confidence from his readers, which he is not willing to render to others. He enters, 
apparently for the first time, into the field of physiology, with a feeling nearly allied 
to contempt for the attainments of all its previous cultivators (The North American 
Review 1842:464-466). 
Another important nutritional line of work which would be brought forward from the 
1600s into the 19th century involved studies of the human body as analogous to an 
engine, with an interest in calculating the efficiency of that human engine. In 1861, for 
example, Hermann Helmholz (1821 – 1894) “estimated that the human ‘engine functioned 
with about 25% efficiency’” (quoted in Carpenter, 2003a:642). In another related 
experiment, a Swiss scientist compared the amount of protein that a human body could 
break down with the amount of energy expended by a pair of mountain climbers, and 
concluded that the fuel utilized by the human body must come primarily from fats and 
carbohydrates, not from the breakdown of protein (Carpenter, 2003a:642), an 
interpretation upheld by later studies. 
The latter part of the 19th century, however, saw a continued focus on protein and energy as 
the primary sources of nutrition leading to healthy humans. Wolf and Carpenter (1997:1255) 
noted that, between about 1860 - 1910, Germany attracted many American and European 
postgraduate students who desired to learn from the most influential nutritional minds of 
the day. Two important figures that would carry the energy cause late into the century were 
Carl Voit (1831 - 1908) in Germany and Wilbur Atwater (1844 - 1907) in the United States. 
Nevertheless, according to Atwater (1888:257-258), although the energy producing nutrients 
were most important, a variety of foods were required to consume the necessary diversity of 
energy types needed to efficiently run the human mental and physical machine. 
An important economic researcher of the 19th century who advocated an ideal-type 
analytical framework was John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873). Mill, and later Max Weber in 
sociology, both utilized a deductively-based scientific method of investigation that relied on 
reductionistic frameworks of ideal types. Zouboulakis (2001) recently analyzed both Mill’s 
and Weber’s views on individualism, ideal-types (optimization), methodological 
reductionism, and the Capitalistic tendencies of human nature. Zouboulakis (2001:32) noted 
that Mill’s method of economic analysis (dubbed the study of ‘economic man’ by later 
writers) was an attempt to isolate behaviors within Capitalistic markets that specifically 
addressed an actor’s ‘desire for wealth’. Mill (1836) recognized that motives other than the 
desire for wealth were also in operation in Capitalistic markets, and these behaviors he 
called ‘disturbing causes’. Furthermore, these disturbing causes eventually must be taken 
into consideration in explaining the full suite of human motives. Nevertheless, Mill believed 
that a focus on the desire for wealth would explain much of the essential actions driving 
behaviors in Capitalist markets (Zouboulakis 2001). 
The latter-half of the 19th century also saw the maturation of the discipline of anthropology. 
Edward Burnett Tylor (1832 – 1917), considered by some the ‘father’ of modern 
anthropology (e.g., Radin 1970) published his classic work Primitive Culture in 1871. Tylor 
grappled with the notion that the laws of the inorganic world, as well as those formulated in 
the study of nonhuman plants and animals, could be equally applied to human behavior. 
Thus, Tylor (1871:2) questioned the validity of studying human action as just another 
example of nature’s overarching laws: 
www.intechopen.com
 
Archaeology, New Approaches in Theory and Techniques 
 
16
Our modern investigators in the sciences of inorganic nature are foremost to recognize, 
both within and without their special fields of work, the unity of nature, the fixity of its 
laws, the definite sequence of cause and effect through which every fact depends on 
what has gone before it, and acts upon what is to come after it… But when we come to 
talk of the higher processes of human feeling and action, of thought and language, 
knowledge and art, a change appears in the prevalent tone of opinion. The world at 
large is scarcely prepared to accept the general study of human life as a branch of 
natural science, and to carry out, in a large sense, the poet’s injunction to ‘Account for 
moral as for natural things.’ To many educated minds there seems something 
presumptuous and repulsive in the view that the history of mankind is part and parcel 
of the history of nature, that our thoughts, wills, and actions accord with laws as 
definite as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, 
and the growth of plants and animals. 
But Tylor (1871:3) sees justification in this very assumption, and thus anthropology is born 
with the goals of establishing laws of human action that accord with those of the inorganic 
and nonhuman worlds: 
We may hasten to escape from the regions of transcendental philosophy and theology, 
to start on a more hopeful journey over more practicable ground. None will deny that, 
as each man knows by the evidence of his own consciousness, definite and natural 
cause does, to a great extent, determine human action. Then, keeping aside from 
considerations of extra-natural interference and causeless spontaneity, let us take this 
admitted existence of natural cause and effect as our standing-ground, and travel on it 
so far as it will bear us. It is on this same basis that physical science pursues, with ever-
increasing success, its quest of laws of nature. 
Tylor therefore advocates the same deductive approach as that discussed by Mill. What, 
then, should constitute the reductionistic hypothesis through which human action, past and 
present, can be interpreted? Tylor (1871:6) responds that it is the self-evident truth that all of 
humankind can be classified as savage, barbaric, or civilized. Further, these self-evident 
truths are to be considered universal and timeless, applicable to all peoples, in all times, at 
all places. 
Mid-to-late 19th century racism disguised as sound science relied on the same general 
principles of ideal-types, optimal states, and reductionism to create visions of superior and 
inferior human races. The ideal race was set in parts of Europe, and its salient features were 
identified, often by measurements of the mouth region and the skull cap. The general 
methodology was similar to the creation of the perfect ‘economic man’ operating within 
Capitalist markets – only here the issue was the perfection of the physiological, mental, and 
social characteristics amongst humans. Thus, with ideal type/optimal state methodology in 
hand, these authors set about a scientific treatise on the idealness of human races by 
defining their salient features and then judging them against a conjectural optimal state that 
humanity could strive to become. In this context, race was the currency to track historically, 
while human perfection served as the optimal state. Policy adoption by governments served 
as the goal of ‘social selection’ to reach the optimal state of humanity. 
Some of the earliest studies of cranial measurements were completed entirely for medical 
purposes, and had no racial undertones (e.g., Friend, 1699). Interestingly, one of the earliest 
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works with racial implications focused not on measurements of the brain case, but on 
measurements of the mouth. Alexander Nasmyth (1758-1840) argued that the lack of tools, 
lack of cooking meats, and the prolonged suckling of infants in primitive races caused them 
to become more prognathic in the mouth than the civilized races, who used tools more often 
than the mouth in processing foods. The measurement of the mouth was a direct reflection 
of the degree to which a society was living in an optimal state of humanity – with upright 
jaw structure representing the ideal type of mouth. It was out of this perfect mouth type that 
prognathism developed in the degenerate savages who migrated from north to south long 
ago (Nasmyth, 1848:193-194). 
Late in the 19th century, the principles of ideal racial types and an optimal state of 
humanity based on racial purity took a cruel turn for the worst (e.g., Gould, 1981). In the 
United States, Carlos Closson was one of its leading proponents. Closson attributed the 
rise of the ‘great’ civilizations to the ambition of the pure races; their decline was 
instigated by cross-breeding with the irrational races, including the Fall of the Roman 
Empire (Closson, 1896:460-461). Closson pondered what to do about all of this racial 
mixing (irrational behavior) that has been occurring for so long, driving down the ideal-
type of race and the optimal state of humanity. He decides there are six fixes for this 
problem, categorized thusly: ‘military, political, religious, moral, legal and economic’ 
(Closson, 1896:462). ‘Military selection’ is always an option to get rid of an inferior race, 
but the costs in superior men of the better races through warfare is considered too high. 
Besides, there are better ways to get rid of people, to mention nothing of the fact that 
inferior breeds may be useful to serve the elite race and to complete lowly tasks that their 
superiors may not wish to engage in themselves. So Closson (1896:465) offered six 
suggestions of how to assist ‘social selection’ to operate in order to “constitute a natural 
aristocracy among a given people”. Closson (1896) attributed much of his data to the 
writings of Georges Vacher De Lapouge (1854 – 1936). De Lapouge, in turn, attributes the 
originality of the idea of a scientific study of superior and inferior races to the Count de 
Gobineau between 1853-1855 (De Lapouge and Closson, 1897). De Gobineau is described 
as a ‘genius’ by De Lapouge and Closson (1897:56-57). 
PEM frameworks of the late 19th century continued the Hobbesian idea that foragers were 
continually facing famine and a caloric-depleted death. Garrick Mallery (1831 -1894) noted 
that “Brutes feed. The best barbarian only eats. Only the cultured man can dine. Savages eat 
when they can get food and continue to eat so long as the food lasts” (Mallery, 1888:195). 
John Wesley Powell (1834 – 1902) provided a vision of naked Darwinian selection: 
“Competition among plants and animals is fierce, merciless, and deadly; out of competition 
fear and pain are born; out of competition come anger, and hatred, and ferocity” (Powell, 
1888:301). Baker (1890:299) combined Mallery’s and Powell’s vision into one succinct 
concept: “The human body abounds in testimony of this sort – indications of the pathway 
by which humanity has climbed from darkness to light, from bestiality to civilization – relics 
of countless ages of struggle, often fierce, bloody, and pitiless”. Burnett (1892:249) 
concurred: 
It is no part of Nature’s plan to be merciful; the fundamental law of all her actions is 
inexorableness. Pitliless and stern, with a deaf ear turned to all appeals for 
consideration or extenuation, she lays the icy fingers of her immutability upon the 
victim and exacts payment of the penalty in full. 
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But late 19th century anthropology was not the only discipline guilty of such visions – some 
economists continued its visions of PEM, too. E. L. Godkin (1831 – 1902), for example, wrote 
that: 
It is no less true that political economy, no matter how  defined, cannot be taught 
without assuming the  existence of an Economic Man who desires above all  things, and 
without reference to ethical considerations,  to get as much of the world’s goods as he 
can with the  least possible expenditure of effort or energy on his own part… Ethics and 
religion in so far as it furnishes a  sanction for ethics, exist for the purpose of deflecting 
him  from his normal course (Godkin 1891:491-492). 
The same deductively-based, reductionistic methodology also led to some ‘higher-order’ 
explanations in the 19th century that, in hindsight, entered the realm of ridiculous. For 
example, Louis Robinson (1894) ironically began his deductively-based conclusions about 
past foraging behavior by arguing that they could only have been brought about by 
previous inductively-driven research. The inductively-generated model that Robinson gives 
credit is Darwin’s theory of evolution: 
Although the Darwinian doctrine of human descent has now been accepted for the best 
part of a generation, we have as yet done little in applying it in interpreting the many 
records of the past which are found in our bodies. The logical tactics necessarily 
adopted by the pioneers of the movement are to some extent accountable for 
subsequent slow progress. While the main question was in dispute all advocates of the 
evolution theory were striving to establish the principle. In doing this it was obviously 
necessary to use the inductive method (Robinson, 1894:467). 
But now that the general principle of evolution, developed through inductively-based 
scholarship, has been accepted by all serious and knowledgeable scientists, it is time to 
jettison the inductive approach to understanding the past through this methodology – for 
deeper levels of understanding, we are told, we must instead turn to deduction: 
But it is evident that the methods resorted to for purposes of conquest are by no means 
those which render a new territory of permanent value to the captors. When the fight is 
over and the victory won, progress is not aided by mangling the carcass slain, or by 
marking time on the field of battle. Now that the principles of evolution have taken 
their place forever among the axioms of science, we must resort to deductive tactics if 
we hope to enjoy the fruits of victory. 
It is wonderful, when this is done, how many of the most dull and trivial facts of every-
day experience become alive with interest. The new philosophy is found to possess a 
transmuting power which changes the very dust of the earth into golden grains of 
knowledge (Robinson, 1894:467). 
Robinson argues that many of the common behaviors seen in human civilized babies can be 
traced directly back to our ‘pithecoid arboreal ancestor’ – these fruits become sweeter when 
we take the self-evident truths that our ancestors lived a nasty, brutish life, one in which 
foragers were ever-staring caloric-depleted death in the face – and place these truths within 
deductive models based on the general Darwinian evolutionary framework. The eight 
innate behaviors of human infants that Robinson chooses to deductively explain through the 
Darwinian framework are: 1) why human infants are fat; 2) why human infants enjoy 
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placing objects in their mouths; 3) why human infants are cute; 4) why human infants cry 
loudly; 5) why human infants fear strangers; 6) why babies are afraid of the dark; 7) why 
human infants are terrified of ferocious beasts; and 8) why human infants are jealous. For 
example, the deductively-based explanation of why babies are afraid of the dark was 
described thusly: 
A fear of being left alone in the dark is almost universal among little children, and yet, 
in ninety- nine cases out of a hundred it is purely instinctive and is not founded on 
personal experience…As I have remarked before, nature develops no new organ or 
quality except to meet a vital want, and has a way of adapting means to ends which 
does not allow of the least surplus. An organism is as exactly adjusted to its 
environment as a casting in metal or plaster to the mould which gave it shape. 
The unreasoning night-fears of infancy may therefore be read as a record of past 
circumstances which at one time rendered them necessary in preserving life. When the 
cave bear and that grisly nondescript the saber-toothed tiger (machairodus latidens) were 
contemporary with the English troglodyte, and when hyenas which could crunch up 
the shin bone of an ox like a stick of macaroni were his next-door neighbors, it was 
obviously indiscreet for a defenceless human being to wander abroad after nightfall 
(Robinson, 1894:475-476). 
More than a century after these deductively-based interpretations of the human infant in 
foraging societies were proposed, the dangers inherent in extreme reductionism that relies 
on Darwinian principles as a panacea to explain past human behavior are easily illuminated. 
Most of the salient characteristics of the PEM framework are embedded in Robinson’s 
writings, including Darwinian selectionist principles as the sole interpretive framework for 
the explanation of human action that matters in a developmental sequence, as well as self-
interested preservation. 
However, not all of the deductively-driven models of the late 19th century were similar to 
Robinson’s. In fact, perhaps the earliest modern-looking optimal foraging model can be 
found not in the biological literature of the 1960s, but in late 19th century anthropology. 
Perhaps the earliest formal optimal foraging model in anthropology was proposed by 
Otis Tufton Mason (1838 – 1908) in 1894, anticipating those proposed in biology by 70 
years. Mason (1894:275) begins by stating a common perception of both human nature 
and the life of savages as filled with hardships: “The chief contest for the inner man has 
been to appease the insatiable cravings of hunger and thirst”. These inner and outer 
hardships created a tendency for humanity to stay stationary in order to procure the 
material items necessary to overcome them, but also an urge to migrate – to move to 
greener pastures in order to find comfort. According to Mason, in both of these pursuits, 
humans naturally chose paths of least resistance based on the principles of maxima and 
minima because the day-to-day struggle for life was so harsh. And here, Mason (1894:276) 
has also anticipated the studies of least effort in experimental psychology by at least 30 
years: 
The law of the circle of employments and of permanent migration may be called the 
maxima and minima of effort – that is, men have always bestirred themselves the year 
round and moved about the world on lines and to places where there seemed to be 
promise of the greatest bodily comfort and security for the least effort. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Archaeology, New Approaches in Theory and Techniques 
 
20
In this paper especial attention will be paid to this maxima and minima in relation to 
the food quest, though it will be seen that following this line conducts also to the best 
results in the other activities mentioned. 
Mason then proposes his optimal foraging model to explain the peopling of the Americas. 
Anticipating modern prey choice models by more than 80 years, Mason (1894:278) argues 
that the most attractive game within inner terrestrial-based environments is large 
herbivores, but where available, marine environments offer the greatest subsistence rewards 
for the least amount of effort: “The greatest natural food supply for the least effort, with few 
exceptions, was in the water”. Mason proposed that humans choose which foods to eat and 
which to ignore based primarily on net gross food return rates, considering the abundance 
and variety of foods in relation to their availability on a seasonal basis, capture costs, and 
preparation costs. Given these principles, Mason (1894:279) proposes a deductively-based 
model of the probable migration route of the earliest inhabitants of North America – one 
that likely began in the Indo-Malaysia region of Asia, reached the Pacific coast of North 
America, and eventually ending in South America. 
The theoretical development of PEM was essentially complete by the end of the 19th 
century. Therefore, there would be only minor developments in optimization models 
throughout the 20th century. From this point forward to the present day, optimization 
models have simply been applied to different data sets, often under the disguise of different 
names to make them appear new or unique. 
3.4 Early 20
th
 century: Primitive Economic Man runs his course in nutrition, becomes 
despised in anthropology, but lands feet-first in experimental psychology 
Max Weber (1864 - 1920) took the research methodology that focused on ideal-types and 
conjectural optimal states of behavior to define rationality into 20th century sociology 
(Zouboulakis, 2001:30). In Weber’s 1915 essay concerning Indian religion, for example, he 
gives an account of the ideal-type method of analysis, noting that the rational behavior 
generated from it does not necessarily exist in reality, rather it serves as a point of reference 
to judge how closely actual behaviors reach the conjectural optimal state (Weber, 1915, 
translated in Gerth and Mills, 1946:323-324): 
The constructed scheme, of course, only serves the purpose of offering an ideal typical 
means of orientation. It does not teach a philosophy of its own… As will readily be 
seen, the individual spheres of value are prepared with a rational consistency which is 
rarely found in reality. But they can appear thus in reality and in historically important 
ways, and they have… They enable us to see if, in particular traits or in their total 
character, the phenomena approximate one of our constructions: to determine the 
degree of approximation of the historical phenomenon to the theoretically constructed 
type. 
Here, then, are all the elements of the deductive method of defining rationality in the 
analysis of social phenomena. Weber was one of the early users of the term ‘Homo 
oeconomicus’ to refer to Mill’s model Capitalist. But “Weber … rejected income-maximizing 
homo economicus and sought to replace him with the status-maximizing homo politicus, at 
least within the bounds of pre-modern Europe” (Christesen, 2003:31-32). Modern 
archaeological models have combined Weber’s Homo politicus with PEM’s Darwinian 
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framework to form models under various names, including “costly-signaling theory”, 
“prestige hunting”, and “showing off” (e.g., Broughton and Bayham, 2002). 
3.4.1 Ideal cases and reductionism continued: The optimization prophecy of Wilhelm 
Ostwald 
Early 20th century textbooks on theoretical mechanics and natural philosophy continued the 
dialogue on the principle of maxima and minima in nature and the conservation of energy. 
An early 20th century textbook on theoretical mechanics by James Hopwood Jeans (1877 – 
1946) was later cited by George Zipf as one of his inspirations for developing the Principle of 
Least Effort in psychology (see below). The goal of several influential natural philosophy 
texts remained unchanged from earlier times: unite the actions of the living and nonliving 
under a single principle: the efficient utilization of energy. One of these general texts was 
published in 1910 by Wilhelm Ostwald (1853 - 1932). As in Mill’s economics and Weber’s 
sociology, Ostwald argues for a focus on ideal-types, or optimal states, and reductionism as 
the best method for investigating natural philosophy and science. But Ostwald (1910:45) 
specifically argued that Mill’s disturbing causes are irrelevant when he wrote that “…we 
repeatedly so find or can form our experiences that certain natural relations preponderatingly 
determine the experience, while the other parts that remain undetermined fall into the 
background. The prophecy will cover so considerable a part of the experience that we can forego 
previous knowledge of the rest”. Ostwald (1910:46-47) then outlined what can be considered the 
current working deductive model used in North American archaeology today: 
A case in which none of the extraneous elements of experience operate is called an ideal 
case, and the inference from a series of values leading to the limit-value is an 
extrapolation. Such extrapolations to the ideal case are a quite natural procedure in science, 
and a very large part of natural laws, especially, all quantitative laws, that is, such as 
express a relation between measurable values, have precise validity only in ideal cases. 
Ostwald argues that natural philosophy should decide which finite causes are likely to be 
the most instrumental in guiding behaviors in the living universe. Sound science makes 
these reductionistic determinations, and then seeks out those actions or behaviors that 
appear to confirm the law. Scientists can make observations, interpret them according to the 
law, and this makes the living world knowable and useful. So what should the final cause of 
living action be? 
Since our opinion as to what constitutes a higher and lower organism is doubtless 
arbitrary, let us ask whether it is not possible to find an objective standard by which to 
measure the relative perfection of the different organisms. The question must be 
answered in the affirmative when we take into consideration the following. Since the 
quantity of available free energy upon the earth is limited, the organism which 
transforms the energy at its disposal more completely and with the least loss into the 
forms of energy necessary for the function of life, must be regarded as the more perfect 
organism (Ostwald 1910:176). 
If we substitute the concept of ‘fitness’ for the word ‘perfect’ in the passage above, we would 
have the essential argument of modern optimization models and current constructs of PEM 
under the umbrella of “evolutionary ecology”. Here is Ostwald’s passage again with the 
substitution of two words: 
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Since our opinion as to what constitutes a higher and lower organism is doubtless 
arbitrary, let us ask whether it is not possible to find an objective standard by which to 
measure the relative [fitness] of the different organisms. The question must be 
answered in the affirmative when we take into consideration the following. Since the 
quantity of available free energy upon the earth is limited, the organism which 
transforms the energy at its disposal more completely and with the least loss into the 
forms of energy necessary for the function of life, must be regarded as the more [fit] 
organism. 
Ostwald’s prophecy was about to become law, despite the best efforts of nutrition science, 
which was about to bury PEM, and anthropology, which learned to despise him in the early 
20th century. 
3.4.2 Nutrition science begins to build Primitive Economic Man’s coffin 
At the time of Ostwald’s writings, a major breakthrough in the understanding of nutritional 
requirements of human health was occurring. In 1911, E. B. Hart of the University of 
Wisconsin and colleagues embarked on a program to test some of Liebig’s protein/energy 
imperative conclusions (Harper, 1997:1027S-1028S). In what became known as the 
‘Wisconsin single grain experiment’, Hart and colleagues definitively showed that healthy 
diets required more nutrients than simply protein and a few minerals (Harper, 1997:1027S-
1028S). 
It was also becoming widely known that mice fed purified diets consisting solely of energy 
sources died rather quickly, but when milk was added to these diets the animals flourished. 
The implication of these studies was that there existed a type of nutrient, or a number of 
nutrients, other than proteins, carbohydrates, and fats, that were present in milk that made 
the difference between life and death in the living universe. One of the implications was that 
the living world was more than machines of energy moving through space. That analogy 
was untenable. 
One of these important papers appeared in 1915, and was entitled The Nature of the Dietary 
Deficiencies of Rice (McCollum and Davis, 1915). In this paper we get a first-hand account of 
researchers who knew the energy-imperative paradigm to be wrong, and knew also that 
other, undefined organic-based nutrients had as much impact on mammalian growth and 
development as proteins, carbohydrates, and fats. McCollum and Davis (1915:183-184) 
called these undefined nutrients ‘accessory substances’. The fat-soluble accessory substance 
that McCollum and Davis knew to be vital to mammalian growth and development would 
later be known as vitamin-A. The water-soluble accessory substance(s), for which McCollum 
and Davis were unsure of the number, could have included folate, riboflavin, and/or 
thiamin, all critical to human growth and body maintenance. 
Thus, McCollum and Davis (1915:185) dismantled the notion that, in the living world, 
energy alone could promote growth when they wrote that: “…all of which make it evident 
that purified proteins, fats having the growth-promoting property, and salt mixtures of appropriate 
composition, cannot adequately supplement polished rice so as to produce a diet which will support 
growth”. In a case of bitter irony, then, McCollum and Davis (1915:192) argued that 
increasing attention to the non-energy producing accessory substances would lead to 
significant economic benefits through better health and nutrition. 
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The second decade of the 20th century finally witnessed the naming of these accessory 
substances – ‘vitamines’ (Frank and Dubin, 1920; Funk, 1925, 1926; Myers and Voegtlin, 
1920). By 1918, some nutritionists were actively promoting the essentiality of these nutrients 
to healthy diets, and recognizing that diversity of diet was necessary to consume adequate 
quantities of these essential nutrients: 
Vitamines as a class are now acceptably divided into a fat soluble and a water soluble 
type. Both are absolutely essential in a complete diet and both vary considerably in 
their occurrence. Individually many foods are deficient in one or both of them, but 
safety has undoubtedly been assured to the consumer by his desire for variety 
(Steenbock, 1918:119). 
And by the end of the decade, three ‘vitamines’ were being named by letter (e.g., Dutcher 
et al., 1919:184). Shortly thereafter, nutritionists were on the trail of other non-caloric 
nutrients that were critical to the survival of animals. While not yet chemically isolated, 
they were learning that some foods such as green leafy vegetables were so rich in these 
nutrients that they could make the difference between life and death. Consider these 
passages from Evans and Bishop (1922:650-651), who were hot on the trail of ‘substance 
X’, later called vitamin E: 
Natural foodstuffs contain a substance, X, which prevents such a sterility or which 
cures the disorder occasioned by the purified dietary regime. We have thus been able to 
witness a comparatively sudden restoration of fertility to animals of proven sterility, 
and whose controls continued sterile, by the administration of fresh green leaves of 
lettuce. 
These studies demonstrated, once and for all, that energy sources could not be considered 
by themselves a key currency to tracking animal health patterns. From this point (roughly 
1920) forward to the present day, advocates of PEM models would ignore these essential 
facts – but in the earliest stages of the 20th century, PEM ideals were still in good company 
to all but a few heretics who were quietly building PEM’s coffin in the nutrition sciences. 
3.4.3 Alfred Kroeber’s superorganic challenge to Ostwaldian prophecy 
In an important early 20th century anthropology paper, Alfred Kroeber (1876 – 1960) 
challenged the ideas that Darwinian selection could explain all human behaviors of any 
consequence to science, as well as the notion that human action could be understood 
through mechanistic principles based on reductionistic ideals (Kroeber, 1917). Kroeber’s 
prophecy, however, was that the study of human behavior would be overtaken, so to speak, 
by the forces of organic evolution, while the true study of the meaning of human action – 
the social – would be swept aside in the reductionism inherent in zealous claims that the 
principles of Darwinian selection could explain the essence of human thought and action. 
Considering the tenacity of the PEM framework, Kroeber can be regarded as a seer in this 
regard. Kroeber’s analysis, indeed criticism, of interpreting human action under the same 
theoretical principles as organic evolution anticipated some of the objections to optimization 
approaches developed much later in the century. 
Kroeber (1917:208, 212) argued for holistic views of human action, and warned against 
scientific reductionism: 
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Science will attack historical material – social material – by converting it into organic 
terms - whether psychical or physical does not matter, so long as the ever present 
individual physiological aspect or basis of the social phenomena is dealt with. These 
organic results will then be ready for interpretation by the methods of physics and 
chemistry. Thus the material will be made part of that great unit, the system that 
justifies and elevates science to its high plane – the system that is pervaded by the 
principle of mechanical causality as its essence. 
The forces and principles of mechanistic science can indeed analyze our civilization; but 
in so doing they destroy its essence, and leave us without understanding of the very 
thing which we seek. 
3.4.4 Bronislaw Malinowski heads to the Trobriand Islands and fails to discover 
Primitive Economic Man 
In the 1920’s, PEM was so pervasive in the thoughts of economists and others that 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1884 – 1942) devoted some time to dismembering him in his classic 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific, first published in 1922: 
Another notion which must be exploded, once and for ever, is that of the Primitive 
Economic Man of some current economic text books. This fanciful, dummy creature, 
who has been very tenacious of existence in popular and semi-popular economic 
literature, and whose shadow haunts even the minds of competent anthropologists, 
blighting their outlook with a pre-conceived idea, is an imaginary, primitive man, or 
savage, prompted in all his actions by a rationalistic conception of self-interest, and 
achieving his aims directly and with the minimum of effort. Even one well established 
instance should show how preposterous is this assumption that man, and especially 
man on a low level of culture, should be actuated by pure economic motives of 
enlightened self-interest. The primitive Trobriander furnishes us with just such an 
instance, contradicting this fallacious theory. He works prompted by motives of a 
highly complex, social and traditional nature, and towards aims which are certainly not 
directed towards the satisfaction of present wants, or to the direct achievement of 
utilitarian purposes. Thus, in the first place, as we have seen, work is not carried out on 
the principle of the least effort. On the contrary, much time and energy is spent on 
wholly unnecessary effort, that is, from a utilitarian point of view (Malinowski 1922:60). 
Despite ethnographies such as Malinowski’s Argonauts, essays by Kroeber, and research on 
vitamins in nutrition, these studies did nothing to slow the progression of PEM in natural 
philosophical texts. If anything, the PEM framework became even more trustworthy for its 
proponents than ever before. And nobody exemplified this fact any better during the third 
decade of the 20th century than Alfred Lotka. 
3.4.5 The extended hand of Wilhelm Ostwald: Alfred Lotka’s energetics and human 
nature 
In precisely the same year that Malinowski published his Argonauts, Alfred Lotka (1880 - 
1949) was publishing a series of articles in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
advocating a mechanistic view of human evolution based on energetics. Lotka (1922:147) 
wrote that: 
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It has been pointed out by Boltzmann that the fundamental object of contention in the 
life struggle, in the evolution of the organic world, is available energy. In accord with 
this observation is the principle that, in the struggle for existence, the advantage must 
go to those organisms whose energy-capturing devices are most efficient in directing 
available energy into channels favorable to the preservation of the species. 
The first effect of natural selection thus operating upon competing species will be to 
give relative preponderance (in number or mass) to those most efficient in guiding 
available energy in the manner indicated. 
Three years after these writings, Lotka (1925) published his Elements of Physical Biology. 
Here, Lotka detailed his ideas concerning both the mechanical side of human behavior and 
the other behaviors guided more by cognitive choice. Lotka (1925) called the mechanistic 
side of human action ‘rigid behavior’, or, more famously, the ‘automaton type’; the more 
symbolic aspects of human action he called the ‘elastic type’. Elastic behaviors, of course, are 
nothing more than Mill’s (1836) ‘disturbing causes’ and Weber’s Homo politicus. 
Lotka (1925:350) then states that ‘lower’ organisms such as plants live on an “automaton type 
of behavior schedule”; “But in the higher animals, and most particularly man, we have an 
elastic behavior-schedule….”. Ironically, Lotka (1925) then argues that elastic behaviors are 
superior to automaton types. Any changes, or adjustments, in the operation of free choice 
would naturally tend toward those behaviors favorable to the individuals of the species, and 
thus they would tend toward a maximum. In this case, the maximum or currency to track is 
energetic efficiency. But then Lotka (1925:352) considers all of these deductions within a 
framework of ideal types and optimal states, and in the process reduces them further to the 
rigid types of human action, turning his model of the ideal type of human being into an 
automaton, representing classic PEM modeling: 
Relation between Ideal and Actual Organism. We have thus far considered an ideal 
type of organism of the free choice type of behavior schedule, constructed on the 
principle that the λ’s shall be so chosen as to make the proportional rate of increase r a 
maximum. 
It remains to consider the relation between this ideal type of organism and the actual 
organism. The actual organism is not consciously guided by any consideration of the 
effect of his actions upon the rate of increase of his species… What guides a human 
being, for example, in the selection of his activities, are his tastes, his desires, his 
pleasures and pains, actual or prospective. This is true, at least, of some of his actions, 
those which are embraced in his free-choice type of behavior schedule. That the 
human behavior schedule also contains an element of the non-elastic (automaton) 
type may be admitted in deference to those who have leveled their destructive 
criticism at the hedonistic account of human behavior. We may, however, restrict our 
discussion here to that portion or phase of conduct which is determined by hedonistic 
influences. 
So what portions of the human condition naturally lend themselves to hedonistically-
generated models of automaton action? It’s foraging for food, because the health and 
welfare of plants and animals are primarily determined by the efficient capture of free 
energy: 
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The behavior schedule has been quantitatively defined in terms of energy. This if not 
the only possible definition, is at any rate a convenient one, and has also the advantage 
of emphasizing the important relation of the organism to the energy sources of his 
environment. His correlating apparatus is primarily an energy capturing device – its 
other functions are undoubtedly secondary.  The life contest, then is primarily a 
competition for available energy, as has been pointed out by Boltzmann. Energy in this 
sense and for this reason has value for the organism – which is a very different thing 
from saying (as some have said or implied) that economic value is a form of energy 
(Lotka 1925:354-355). 
Lotka (1925:356-357) places the self-interested energy-maximizers into the classic Darwinian 
framework of the struggle for survival, thereby completing the optimality-based PEM 
framework: 
Our reflections so far have been directed to the selfish efforts of each organism and 
species to divert to itself as much as possible of the stream of available energy. 
This at least seems probable, that so long as there is an abundant surplus of available 
energy running “to waste” over the sides of the mill wheel, so to speak, so long will a 
marked advantage be gained by any species that may develop talents to utilize this “lost 
portion of the stream.” Such a species will therefore, other things being equal, tend to 
grow in extent (numbers) and this growth will further increase the flux of energy through 
the system. It is to be observed that in this argument the principle of the survival of the 
fittest yields us information beyond that attainable by the reasoning of thermodynamics. 
Lotka (1925:430-431) ends with a metaphysical idealism, with one more deductive state of 
optimality to propose – man’s unity with Nature. 
The fact seems to be that the operation of a fundamental purpose or design in Nature is 
one of those things that can neither be proved nor disproved. We are, therefore, at 
liberty, if we so choose to, believe in such a purpose. This is an occasion for the 
legitimate exercise of faith. 
We may, if we will, embrace this purpose for our own. Such will spells ultimate 
survival. No better guarantee for the welfare of the race could be furnished, than its 
essential harmony with Nature. Selection, then, would seem to point the way toward a 
will in conformity with that general principle which, for want of a better term, we may 
describe as the Supreme Purpose of the Universe. 
3.4.6 The non-caloric organic nutrients change the face of nutrition and disease: The 
vitamin revolution buries Primitive Economic Man in the nutrition sciences 
Research into the ‘vitamines’, especially vitamins A, B, C, and E accelerated during the early 
1920s (e.g., Bishop, 1922; Evans and Leersum, 1929; Funk and Dubin, 1920; Funk, 1925, 1926; 
Myers and Voegtlin, 1920). With increasing discussion of the value of incorporating these 
nutrients into diets, some were advocating caution in the creation of dietary guidelines for 
the intake of the non-caloric nutrients because vitamin research was being performed almost 
exclusively on nonhuman animals (Mitchell, 1922). For example, by 1925 vitamin E 
deficiency had been advanced as one of the factors that had a primary influence on sterility 
in mice (Evans and Burr, 1925). 
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Then, between 1926-1939, in 13 short years, 12 essential vitamins had been isolated 
chemically, including thiamin, niacin, folate, riboflavin, and vitamins B6, C, A, D, E, and K 
(Carpenter, 2003c:3028, Table 2). As noted above, between about 1900 – 1920, a fundamental 
shift in thinking within nutrition science took place. Within these two decades, it became 
apparent that many diseases and malformations, including scurvy, rickets, beriberi, night 
blindness, and pellagra could be prevented or treated by adding specific food items that 
contained nutrients other than carbohydrates, fats, and proteins to the human diet (e.g., 
Elvehjem, 1949). These afflictions, which greatly influenced human demographic patterns in 
some regions, were not caused by viruses nor by insufficient intake of energy or minerals. 
Rather, they were caused by deficiencies in unknown organic-based nutrients – and the 
search was on to define and isolate them (Carpenter, 2003c; Carpenter et al., 1997). This 
brought about the revolution of understanding of essential nutrient diversity and human 
health and development in nutrition science between 1910 -1940. And this spelled the death 
of PEM modeling in that discipline. 
For instance, it was discovered that ‘Factor A’ (later called vitamin A) was crucial to 
understanding growth and development in mice, as well as treating and preventing night 
blindness – although this vitamin was not isolated chemically until 1939 (Carpenter, 2003c). 
Growth and the ‘antiberiberi factor’ were related to ‘vitamin B’ (with B1 isolated in 1926); 
rickets was tied to a factor we now call vitamin D, and isolated in 1931, and so forth 
(Carpenter, 2003c). As the vitamins began to fall to science, so to speak, the essential 
minerals began to receive increasing attention in the 1920s and 1930s as well. As an example, 
copper was isolated as a factor in the health of cattle in 1931 (Carpenter, 2003c). 
One final piece of nutrition research that falls between the two decades 1920-1940 involved 
the relationship between energy consumption and life span. As Carpenter (2003c) notes, as 
early as 1917 researchers had discovered a link between early calorie restriction and 
increased life span in mice. In 1927, Clive McCay (1920 – 1967) confirmed this finding, 
concluding that the life span of rats could be greatly enhanced by restricting their 
consumption of calories (energy) early in life. 
Between 1920 – 1940, then, the nutrition sciences firmly established the link between dietary 
diversity and human health patterns, including the significant roles played by non-caloric 
nutrients. This general principle has been confirmed by thousands of empirical research 
projects conducted over the past 65 years – and forms the central concept of nutritional 
ecology. 
3.4.7 Primitive Economic Man moves into experimental psychology 
Beginning in the 1930s, experimental psychologists decided to apply PEM modeling in their 
research. One of the more important articles linking animal behavior with the principle of 
least effort was published by Joseph Gengerelli (1905 – 2000) in 1930. Gengerelli studied the 
behavior of rats moving through a maze to obtain food at the end of the line. Current PEM 
frameworks are similar to the research Gengerelli carried out on rats in the 1930s. Substitute 
‘ecological habitat’ for the maze and ‘human foragers’ for rats, and one essentially sees the 
basics of modern PEM modeling. Gengerelli’s early research also continued the tradition of 
framing itself within the parameters of reductionism, ideal-types or optimal states, least 
effort or action, maxima and minima, and deductive reasoning. 
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In the press and strife of actual research…the problem is to determine which one of the 
“blunt facts” we shall choose as the corner stone of our explanation. Obviously we must 
choose those which are capable of embracing all of the varied phenomena with which 
we have to deal. Also those facts which are “self- evident”; which do not themselves 
stand in need of explanation. 
This is the crux of our problem. In psychology, at least, there is no unanimous 
agreement as to what the fact or facts are which do not stand in need of explanation… 
In general, modern psychologists have been too ambitious. They have been drawn with 
an inevitable fatality to the “self-evident” facts and laws of mechanics (Gengerelli 
1930:194-195). 
Gengerelli attempts to establish a ‘law’ of least action, but he notes that the law applies only 
to specific circumstances; namely specific external and internal conditions arising from need 
(1930:228-229): 
In view of the fact that our ordinary tools of frequency, recency, redintegration, etc., fail 
to resolve the phenomenon to a simpler, more fundamental, level, there is only one 
thing left to do: - state the facts and their conditions as simply and as abstractly as 
possible. We are therefore forced to state in a somewhat axiomatic form that it is a 
fundamental law of behavior that the organism, under the stress of a need, tends in 
consequence of repetition, to relieve that need by the process of least effort. 
In other words, the capacity of the various stimuli in the external situation to elicit 
responses from the animal becomes changed and organized in a fashion prescribed by a 
definite law. The law, namely, that the behavior of the animal, in relieving its need, shall 
become the minimum possible. 
In 1937, R. H. Waters repeated Gengerelli’s maze experiments utilizing both rats and human 
subjects. His goal was to test three related but somewhat different hypotheses, or ‘Laws of 
the Principle of Least Effort’ that had been recently proposed in experimental psychology: 
(1) R. H. Wheeler’s (1929) Law of Least Action; (2) J. A. Gengerelli’s (1930) Principle of 
Maxima and Minima (described above), and (3) L. S. Tsai’s (1932) Law of Minimum Effort. 
Waters finds some positive aspects to both Gengerelli’s and Tsai’s formulations, but because 
he recognizes that behavioral variability will be contingent upon physiological and 
cognitive differences between organisms, external constraints, and the like, he prefers Tsai’s 
Law of Minimum Effort. Interestingly, George Zipf (1902 - 1950) would later take ‘Principle’ 
from Gengerelli’s formulation, ‘Least’ from Wheeler’s formulation, and ‘Effort’ from Tsai’s 
formulation to concoct the ‘Principle of Least Effort’ in 1949, apparently unaware that 
Malinowski had used the term to refer to PEM 27 years earlier. 
Nevertheless, while recognizing some positive aspects to Tsai’s Law of Minimum Effort, 
Waters also recognized some limitations in that formulation. One of these is the dimension 
of pain. Specifically, even rats may not choose a path of least resistance or greatest energetic 
efficiency if that path causes pain. In contrast, non-living phenomenon such as water 
flowing down a mountain may follow a path of least resistance, but in doing so feels no pain 
on its journey downward. The water has no other incentive or built-in behavioral 
capabilities to choose its path down the mountain. Waters has therefore challenged the 
notion that the living and nonliving are equivalent dimensions that can be explained by a 
single, overarching ‘law’. But the energy maximizing hypothesis is too strong, so Waters 
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(1937:16-17) suggests simply incorporating the pain dimension into the minimum effort 
equation: 
Gengerelli points out that by taking the wall these animals avoided the pain consequent 
upon bumping into these obstacles. This is clearly an instance showing that, if the 
pathway of minimum effort involves painful stimulation to the animal, then that 
pathway will be avoided. It might be suggested, however, that the Law of Minimum 
Effort be so interpreted as to include the pain  dimension, that is, that that pathway 
involving least painful stimulation will be taken. If this were done, then we would be 
able to say that the Law of Minimum Effort, with the limitations already mentioned, 
holds for the following dimensions: distance, time, effort, and pain. 
We can sense in this passage an attempt to salvage a doomed scientific postulate. Waters 
previously noted that dimensions such as pain were unquantifiable, and even if it could be 
quantified, it would be so variable amongst individuals that the dimension would remain 
largely unknowable. And yet Waters insisted on making living dimensions such as pain part 
of what he would call a Law of Minimum Effort. Waters writings also beg the questions: If 
pain influences a rat’s decision regarding whether or not to choose a path of least resistance 
or least expenditure of energy, what about other dimensions that must be taken into account 
to understand human behavior such as love, desire, hate, jealousy, sympathy, apathy and 
the like? Can we quantify all of those dimensions? How, then, would this Law be applied to 
human behavior? Ironically, Waters all but answered these questions – namely that the Law 
of Minimum Effort does not apply to human behavior. 
In the case of the human subjects no single explanation seems possible, due to the 
reasons they gave for taking the several paths. If they did manifest a preference, 
regardless of the number of turns required by it, they usually claimed that it seemed 
shorter or easier. However, many subjects were activated by other motives, such as the 
desire to go as many different ways as possible, the thought that the aim of the test was 
to see how many ways they could find, the fear that they would lose their way if they 
tried another, and so on… With such maze structure and with such a welter of motives,  
each individual case becomes a law unto itself and thus prohibits, in our situations at 
least, the formulation of any single explanatory principle (Waters 1937:17-18). 
Waters then notes that not only does his research indicate that the Law of Minimum Effort 
does not apply to human behavior, but others had already noted as such: 
Tolman …points out that, if there is some physiological principle, some principle of 
least effort, at the basis of behavior, a knowledge of this fact is relatively barren. “For, 
given the present parlous state of our physiological knowledge, it appears that the mere 
fact of such a principle allows us to predict nothing beforehand and prior to concrete 
behavior experiments”. Now, in the first place, he is not in reality telling us to “go to” 
with our attempts at demonstrating this principle… (Waters, 1937:18). 
Despite evidence that the PEM framework was untenable as an explanation of human 
action, the model became the ultimate panacea of explanation in the universe with the 
writings of George Zipf in the 1940s. For Zipf, everything in the universe boiled down to the 
tri-fold phenomena of any real consequence: matter (or energy or action), time, and space 
(including distance). These interact to create the one true law that unites the entire spectrum 
of the universe, the living and the nonliving. 
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In 1942, Zipf was unconcerned about the exact title of his unifying principle. For him, least 
action, minimum effort and energetic efficiency were essentially synonymous terms. 
As to the verbal pitfall, we must remember that the minimum of least-action can be 
described equally well by using other words….Yet a different verbal label will not 
necessarily entail the presence of a different minimum. 
There are further variants of least-action, such as least-work, least-labor, or, in more 
disguised form, the economical use of energy… Nevertheless fundamental drives 
remain fundamental drives, regardless of verbal dressing (Zipf 1942:50-51). 
The most fundamental feature of the universe for Zipf is the fact that as time passes, matter 
moves through space. Once this fundamental fact is realized, then all phenomena can be 
explained with reference to it. We must further realize that of the tripartite phenomena, 
matter (or action) (or energy) is the most important. Once these salient features of the 
universe are realized, the only thing remaining is to have faith that these principles guide 
every action in the universe, the living as well as the nonliving. But for Zipf, it was not faith 
to believe in these principles – it was simply a rational, self-evident conclusion to any right-
thinking person. 
It is commonly assumed by natural scientists that there is a “unity of nature” in the 
sense of a “continuity of natural law.” In other words, it is assumed that all of nature 
(i.e., “the entire universe”) is organized as a single great unit according to a single body 
of law which operates at all times and at all places throughout the entire universe. 
According to this assumption, the same general natural law that governs the structure 
and behavior of astronomical bodies governs also the structure and behavior of our 
planet, of life on our planet, and, indeed, of even the smallest minutiae of living activity 
including the most subtle emotional and intellectual elaborations of human mind (Zipf, 
1942:48). 
Zipf contrasts this right-way of thinking with those who believe that variability in behavior 
does not necessarily reflect a deep-rooted, fundamental law of nature. To Zipf, it is the 
ignorant who think that nature can organize the living in myriad of ways that show fits of 
randomness. 
In this argument about the existence of social laws, we notice that those who assume the 
unity of nature, or the continuity of natural law, conclude that there are social laws (and 
hereinafter we shall call them the natural social scientists). By the same token, those 
who believe that there are no such things as social laws, automatically (though perhaps 
tacitly and unwittingly) conclude that there is no such thing as a unity of nature. These 
opponents of natural law in the social field are often referred to as “political 
theologians” and “economic romanticists”, quite analogous to the quacks in medical 
science…. They might be God who, by definition, decides what the natural codes are to 
be (Zipf, 1942:52). 
But unlike the “quacks” in the medical profession, Zipf understands that his assumption 
must be borne out with empirical research. Thus, he confidently boasts: 
The unity of nature, the continuity of natural law, the universal principle of least- action 
can be established only by rigorous empiric research before whose decision all minds 
must bow(Zipf, 1942:52-53). 
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Zipf appeals to the Capitalist economic writings concerning labor relations for support, and 
in the process, sets the stage for what would become known as materialist models in 
archaeology and patch choice models within an optimal foraging framework in biology and 
archaeology – namely that people must organize themselves on the landscape with an eye 
toward least-effort or least-action. 
If we assume in the company of economists that man tries to save labor (i.e., is 
motivated by the consideration of least-action) in all his activities, we must conclude 
that he will automatically try to save labor in his exploitation of the raw materials of 
nature, not only in the procuring and manufacture of raw materials into finished goods, 
but also in his distribution and consumption of the same (Zipf 1942:53-54). 
But Zipf doesn’t stop there. Like Alfred Lotka before him, Zipf enters into the metaphysical. 
Perhaps, he notes, we will one day determine that the human soul, if it exists, operates 
under the Principle of Least Effort as well. And if that is the case, then Zipf has explained 
the human soul mathematically, and in the process, perhaps, found God. 
Thus, for example, if man has an immortal soul, as many believe, then, according to our 
argument, that immortal soul will exist in obedience to the principle of least-action. 
And whether or not man has such a soul may very well be decided one way or another 
by scientific inquiry, perhaps even sooner than we think (Zipf 1942:62). 
4. Concluding remarks: The future of Primitive Economic Man and nutritional 
ecology 
Hallowed with age, having been found helpful in one or many fields of inquiry, it has been the lot 
of every good idea to be borrowed and reborrowed time and time again, always retaining the 
essence of its old identity, but adding new shades of meaning or losing old ones with every 
borrowing (Hodgen, 1964). 
Many of the central ideas embedded in optimization frameworks were first developed in 
Antiquity two millennia ago. These include individual self-interest, ideal types, optimal 
states, and least effort. The mathematical representations of principles related to maxima 
and minima, least-action, and conservation of the active force or energy, developed 
primarily in the 17th and 18th centuries to describe the movements and interactions of 
matter in the nonliving world, deeply influenced deductively-based ideas about human 
nature and human health patterns in the 19th and 20th centuries. Many of these latter ideas 
have remained intact in the PEM or optimization frameworks in 21st century archaeology 
(e.g., Broughton et al., 2011). PEM was buried in the nutrition sciences 80 years ago, yet 
schemes involving protein pills and bad carbohydrates continue to capture the imagination 
into the 21st century (e.g., see Carpenter, 1994 for protein supremacy arguments reminiscent 
of Liebig’s methods from the middle 1800s). 
Why do PEM models continue to be so attractive to many researchers, even after it has been 
shown that they produce marginal results in discipline after discipline? There could be 
several reasons for PEM’s survival in archaeology. First, there is a certain ring of truth about 
least effort behaviors. For examples, foragers walking across the landscape undoubtedly at 
times (but not always) chose a path of least resistance; and specific technological 
developments undoubtedly became fixed in human societies because they offered greater 
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efficiency in procuring and/or processing foods. Another attractive component to PEM is 
that the models derived from its principles often develop into mathematical formulations 
that are tested with statistics. This gives an aura of “hard science” to these models; in short, 
it looks like good science. Lastly, these models are well suited for the deductive nature of 
the scientific study of archaeology that students are told in graduate school they must 
conform with in order to do ‘good science’ and be ‘good scientists’. 
Although humans occasionally make choices based on energetic efficiency, it has never been 
shown that (a) energetic efficiency is of primary concern to human decision-making; and (b) 
decisions repeatedly based on energetic efficiency would result in greater selective fitness 
over time. In contrast, it has been repeatedly shown that humans make decisions about what 
to eat and what not to eat based on a multitude of reasons (such as taste preferences, taboos 
and the like) that have nothing to do with energetic efficiency in either the procurement or 
consumption of those foods. Ethnographic research on a multitude of foraging societies 
across the globe do not suggest that hunter-gatherers were in a perpetual state of famine or 
chronic energy deficiency (e.g., Lee and Daly, 2006b; Lee and Devore, 1968); nor were their 
actions overly concerned with seeking more efficient or most efficient methods to capture 
and consume calories. Past societies, like those documented ethnographically, likely had a 
multitude of choices – about what to eat and when and where to eat it. And in many 
environments, both past and present, there were likely a multitude of ways to procure the 
nutrients to sustain the next generation, none of which necessitated ‘optimal’ behaviors in 
terms of either macronutrient or micronutrient intake. And when it comes to selective 
fitness, those human foragers who were only concerned about procuring calories with the 
least effort would likely find themselves outcompeted and soon extinct by others who chose 
(probably unwittingly) a diet that resulted in the consistent consumption of a wide diversity 
of all the essential nutrients necessary to sustain mother and child. 
One of the most ironic factors about PEM modeling in archaeology and its reliance on the 
deductive method is that the concept of Darwinian selective fitness developed primarily 
through inductive rather than deductive research. It is difficult to see how deductively 
based research can be considered ‘superior’ to inductively based research, or, worse yet, 
how deductively based research can be considered ‘more scientific’ in the sense that all 
research should be conducted under the umbrella of a deductive model. I think that most of 
archaeology’s fact-building and learning continues to occur through the “Well I’ll be 
damned” factor. Inductively based archaeological research, whether through new 
excavations, experimental archaeology, the development of new technologies applied to old 
data, and the interpretations resulting from this research often result in new discoveries that 
teach us more about the who, what, where, when, and why of past societies than deductive 
approaches. PEM modeling is a good example. It has been used and abused in multiple 
disciplines for centuries, and in those disciplines concerned with explaining human 
behavior (economics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology) it has proven to provide 
marginal results at best. Deductively based approaches have certainly spurred new methods 
and new ways of looking at data, but the vilification of inductive research in some 
archaeology circles is unjustified. It is rather astonishing just how much we have actually 
learned about past societies through strict inductive research. 
Nutritional ecology is primarily a tool to conduct inductive research and to generate 
inductively-based interpretations and explanations of the past, but it does have its 
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predictive capacities as well. It is a model designed to interpret correlations between 
demographic trends and dietary intake. For example, nutritional ecology has been used in 
the study of Neanderthal extinction in order to model and interpret whether dietary 
differences between modern human and Neanderthal populations could have led to 
differences in the survival rates of women and children in these two populations (Hockett 
and Haws, 2003, 2005). Nutritional ecology essentially asks: did modern humans have a 
selective advantage over Neanderthals due to greater consistency in essential nutrient intake 
in the modern human populations? The framework may have relevance for understanding 
these specific correlations at both the micro-and macro-scales of analysis, although no 
assumption is made that macro-scale patterns are mere reflections of micro-scale actions. 
Quantum physics, or the theory of the very small, may hold lessons in the danger of linking 
micro-scale actions to macro-scale patterns. Nutritional ecology, however, can also inform 
on what is possible in human dietary choice (e.g., Hockett, 2011). 
In certain cases, differences in energy consumption (or chronic energy deficiency) may help 
to understand demographic shifts in the archaeological record, but the nutritional ecology 
framework addresses macronutrient and micronutrient deficiencies or over-consumption 
equally well, so it is a more ‘covering’ paradigm than the PEM framework. For those who 
choose to focus on inductive research and incorporate current knowledge about the effects 
of essential nutrients on mortality and fertility trends, nutritional ecology offers an 
alternative to PEM in archaeological theory building. 
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